

Bang-for-buck:

Australian evidence on the impact of zero emission vehicle purchase incentives

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Contents

Introduction

Background

Methodology

Results

Limitations and further research

Q&A

Appendices

5

6

7

9




Background | Household vehicle emissions

Households contribute almost half (42%) of Australia's greenhouse gas emissions, in particular, vehicles represent 30%.

- Australia has set a climate target of net zero by 2050
- Household vehicles represent 30% of total emissions.
- Electric vehicles remain a fraction of overall vehicle sales in Australia
- Very little research exists on which government policies are most effective
- Deloitte was engaged by an Australian jurisdiction to evaluate a shortlist of hypothetical policies
- Deloitte used a survey and econometric analysis
- The policies likely to get the most uptake are also the most expensive, although there are some policies that deliver better bang for buck

Figure 1: Breakdown of domestic emissions by category




Source: Rewiring Australia (2021)

Introduction | Policies to encourage EV ownership

Electric vehicles represent 2% of total new vehicle sales in Australia compared to 9% globally.

- Electric vehicles have been available in Australia since 2011, although have struggled to take off
- 2% of sales across Australia except in ACT (5%)
- Globally, 9% of new car sales are EV with Europe reaching 17%
- Qualitative evidence presents a range of reasons for slow take up including:
 - Upfront cost
 - Range anxiety
 - Charging infrastructure
 - Installation costs
 - “war on the weekend”
 - Limited second hand market
- International experience shows that government policy is critical

Chart 1: Electric vehicle sales, Australia (2017-2021)



Source: Electric vehicle council (2022)

Background | Policy context

All states and territories have policies aimed at improving the affordability and expediting the transition towards ZEVs.

- Each State/Territory currently has its own policy mix to encourage ZEV uptake.
- Policies not only relate to subsidies but can include regulation and other non-financial incentives
- The current evidence base focusses on retrospective policy evaluations
- Most of these policies involve some public funding and investment
- There is limited evidence (domestic or international) that assesses the relative effectiveness of different policy options

Table 1: State-based ZEV policies

| | Policy | ACT | NSW | NT | QLD | SA | TAS | VIC | WA |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|-------|-----|------|-------|-------|------|-----|----|
| Total funding (millions) | | 10.12 | 595 | 4.64 | 60.25 | 53.25 | 6.78 | 100 | 21 |
| Financial | Purchase cost | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |
| | Operating cost | ✓ | | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| | Vehicle fleets | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | | ✓ | |
| | Behaviour | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | | | | |
| Regulatory | Fuel efficiency standard | | | | | | | | |
| | Sales target | | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | |
| | Government fleet target | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Charging | Public charging | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| | Smart/home charging | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ | | | |
| | Public/private building | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ |
| Strategy | EV manufacturing | | | | | | | | ✓ |
| | Electrify truck/HV | | | | | | | | |
| | Public transport | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | | | ✓ | |
| | Electric micro-mobility | ✓ | | | | ✓ | | | |

Note: Education and awareness policies excluded from table for brevity.
Source: Electric Vehicle Council (2022)


Method | Probabilistic expectations

Deloitte Access Economics

Probabilistic expectations

- *Delavande and Maski (2014)*: studied various hypothetical scenarios and how they would impact the decision to vote or not in the United States.
- *Delavande (2013)*: "Survey respondents can generally understand and answer probabilistic questions, such questions are not prohibitively time-consuming to ask, and the expectations are useful predictors of future behavior and economic decisions."
- **Survey design and data**
- Deloitte survey of 500 residents
- Survey elicited a baseline expected likelihood of purchasing an EV for next vehicle
- Participants are then presented a series of policy questions to see if/how their responsiveness would change

Chart 1: Stylised example of modelling policy impact - Likelihood



Note: Points show average likelihood across sample for each level of subsidy.
Source: Deloitte Access Economics survey (2022)

Method | Probabilistic expectations

Deloitte Access Economics

Generalised policy options

Monetised

- Upfront subsidy
- Installation costs rebate
- Energy costs rebate
- Annual charges rebate


Non-monetised

- Preferential access
- Convenient charging
- Price competitive EVs

Assessment criteria

- Deloitte used marginal effects to determine two assessment criteria
 - Prediction (average estimated likelihood): produces the overall increase in likelihood as a result of the policy
 - Average marginal effect: shows the marginal increase in likelihood for a given policy amount or 'bang-for-buck'

Chart 2: Stylised example of modelling policy impact – Marginal effect




Source: Deloitte Access Economics survey (2022)

Results | Overall

The upfront subsidy has the largest increase in estimated likelihood

- The upfront subsidy has the largest overall impact on a persons likelihood of buying an electric vehicle
 - This is consistent with what we see in other countries and jurisdictions
 - Deloitte did not account for one-off and ongoing costs to government
- Price competitiveness supports the idea that upfront costs still remain the greatest hurdle to adoption
- Charger access indicates that convenience is still an issue for people considering electric vehicles
- Installation costs and energy rebates had the least overall effectiveness of the monetised policies
- Preferential access suggests some relatively cheap options, such as preferential parking, could increase the chance of uptake slightly.

Chart 14: Average estimated likelihood at base and maximum policy amount



Note: Teal-coloured bars indicate non-unitised policy options. Slight variations in the base are expected with predicted models.


Source: Deloitte Access Economics (2021)

Results | Overall

Installation costs rebate has the highest average marginal effect per \$100 of policy value

- The most effective policies are the most expensive
- Upfront subsidy is by far the least cost effective with only an average of 2% increase for each \$100
- Energy costs rebate and annual charges subsidies are more cost effective, but represent ongoing liabilities to the government.
- Installation cost deliver the most 'bang-for-buck'

Chart 15: Average marginal effect – cost effectiveness per \$100



Note: Average marginal effects not estimated for static policies. Policies denoted with '*' indicate ongoing cost to government.

Source: Deloitte Access Economics (2021)

Limitations and next steps

Probabilistic expectations is not infallible

Limitations

- Low sample
- The respondents might not represent wider Australia
- Participants expectations about the future could be unrealistic
- Survey responses might be influenced by social norms

Further research

- Further investigation of the impact across wider Australia
- Additional policy option
- Non-financial policies e.g. access to charging
- Further cohort analysis
- Real data on ZEV uptake

Q&A

Appendices

Survey

Survey questions

Figure A.1: Survey response sample



Source: Deloitte Access Economics (2022)

Survey

Policy question values

Table A.1: Policy values

| Policy | Type | Amount 1 | Amount 2 | Amount 3 |
|-----------------------------|---------|----------|----------|----------|
| Upfront subsidy | One-off | \$1,000 | \$5,000 | \$10,000 |
| Annual charges rebate | Annual | \$100 | \$500 | \$800 |
| Charger installation rebate | One-off | \$100 | \$300 | \$500 |
| Electricity costs rebate | Annual | \$300 | \$500 | NA |

Source: Deloitte Access Economics (2021)


Policy impact

Subsidy: upfront costs


- Across the sample, an additional \$100 in subsidies has an average marginal effect of 0.4 percentage points.
- On average, a \$10,000 subsidy will increase the likelihood of purchasing an EV from 57% to 85%, controlling for other factors.
- The marginal effect in the case of subsidies is declining over the sample, indicating additional subsidies will be incrementally less effective.
- Per hundred dollar, the subsidy policy has the lowest average marginal effect, although the greatest overall impact.

| Variable | Coefficient |
|---------------------------|---------------------|
| Subsidy amount (hundreds) | 0.004*** (0.000) |
| Intercept | 0.351 (0.349) |
| R ² | 0.45 |
| N | 1,500 |

Note: Control variables excluded for brevity. Coefficient on subsidy amount refers to average marginal effect. Standard errors in parentheses
 ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05



Note: Dotted lines indicate upper and lower confidence intervals.
 Source: Deloitte Access Economics (2021)




Source: Deloitte Access Economics (2021)

Policy impact


Subsidy: upfront costs

- A maximum of a \$10,000 subsidy was tested in the survey, this value **increases the likelihood of purchasing an EV** from 57% to 85%, controlling for other factors.
- On average, an additional \$100 in subsidies has an average marginal effect of 0.4 percentage points.
- The marginal effect in the case of subsidies is declining over the sample, indicating additional subsidies will be incrementally less effective.
- Per hundred dollar, the subsidy policy has the lowest average marginal effect (cost effectiveness), although the greatest overall impact.

| Subsidy amount | Uplift relative to the baseline | Marginal impact |
|----------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|
| \$2,000 | 16% | 16% |
| \$4,000 | 24% | 8% |
| \$6,000 | 28% | 4% |
| \$8,000 | 31% | 3% |
| \$10,000 | 32% | 1% |



Note: Dotted lines indicate upper and lower confidence intervals.
Source: Deloitte Access Economics (2021)



Source: Deloitte Access Economics (2021)


Policy impact

Rebate: annual vehicle charges


- An additional \$100 in subsidies has an average marginal effect of 2.6%, across the sample.
- At the maximum subsidy of \$800, the estimated likelihood has increased to from 53% to 70%.
- As in the upfront costs subsidy, the marginal effect is declining, indicating that higher levels of subsidies will have lower overall impact on likelihood.
- Unlike the one-off subsidy, subsidies on annual charges would be an ongoing liability to the ACT government.

| Variable | Coefficient |
|---------------------------|---------------------|
| Subsidy amount (hundreds) | 0.026*** (0.003) |
| Intercept | 0.310 (0.329) |
| R ² | 0.39 |
| N | 1,498 |

Note: Control variables excluded for brevity. Coefficient on subsidy amount refers to average marginal effect. Standard errors in parentheses
 ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05



Note: Dotted lines indicate upper and lower confidence intervals.
 Source: Deloitte Access Economics (2021)



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
Policy impact

Rebate: annual vehicle charges

- An additional \$100 in subsidies has an average marginal effect of 2.6%, on average.
- At the maximum subsidy of \$800, the estimated likelihood increases from 53% to 70%.
- As in the upfront costs subsidy, the marginal effect is declining, indicating that higher levels of subsidies will have lower overall impact on likelihood.
- Unlike the one-off subsidy, subsidies on annual charges would be an ongoing liability to the ACT government.


| Rebate amount | Uplift relative to the baseline | Marginal impact |
|---------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|
| \$200 | 9% | 9% |
| \$400 | 15% | 6% |
| \$600 | 19% | 4% |
| \$800 | 20% | 1% |

Average estimated likelihood – annual charge rebate



Note: Dotted lines indicate upper and lower confidence intervals.
 Source: Deloitte Access Economics (2021)

Likelihood of purchasing an EV as a result of Rebate: annual vehicle charges



Source: Deloitte Access Economics (2021)


Policy impact

Rebate: installation


- Per hundred dollar, installation rebates and energy rebates have an average marginal effect of 3.3% and 2.8% respectively.
- Unlike the last two options, the marginal effect on installation and energy rebates is positive across the sample, indicating greater impact with higher levels of subsidy options considered.
- Installation and energy rebates have the highest average marginal effects of the policy options, although the lower value range results in a smaller policy impact.
- Installation rebates have a larger average marginal effect, even though these costs are one off compared to regular energy rebates.

| Variable | Coefficient (Install) |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|
| Subsidy amount (hundreds) | 0.033*** (0.004) |
| Intercept | 0.650* (0.328) |
| R ² | 0.39 |
| N | 1,478 |

Note: Control variables excluded for brevity. Coefficient refers to average marginal effect. Standard errors in parentheses
 ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05



Source: Deloitte Access Economics (2021)



Note: Dotted lines indicate upper and lower confidence intervals. Source: Deloitte Access Economics (2021)


Policy impact

Rebate: energy costs


- Per hundred dollar, installation rebates and energy rebates have an average marginal effect of 3.3% and 2.8% respectively.
- Unlike the last two options, the marginal effect on installation and energy rebates is positive across the sample, indicating greater impact with higher levels of subsidy options considered.
- Installation and energy rebates have the highest average marginal effects of the policy options, although the lower value range results in a smaller policy impact.
- Installation rebates have a larger average marginal effect, even though these costs are one off compared to regular energy rebates.

| Variable | Coefficient (Energy) |
|---------------------------|----------------------|
| Subsidy amount (hundreds) | 0.028*** (0.004) |
| Intercept | 0.717 (0.361) |
| R ² | 0.37 |
| N | 1,115 |

Note: Control variables excluded for brevity. Coefficient refers to average marginal effect. Standard errors in parentheses
 ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05



Source: Deloitte Access Economics (2021)



Note: Dotted lines indicate upper and lower confidence intervals. Source: Deloitte Access Economics (2021)


Policy impact

Rebate: installation and energy costs

- Per hundred dollar, installation rebates and energy rebates have an average marginal effect of 3.3% and 2.8% respectively.
- Unlike the last two options, the marginal effect on installation and energy rebates is positive across the sample, indicating greater impact with higher levels of subsidy options considered.
- Installation and energy rebates have the highest average marginal effects of the policy options, although the lower value range results in a smaller policy impact.
- Installation rebates have a larger average marginal effect, even though these costs are one off compared to regular energy rebates.


| Rebate amount | Installation | | Energy costs | |
|---------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|
| | Uplift relative to the baseline | Marginal impact | Uplift relative to the baseline | Marginal impact |
| \$100 | 4% | 4% | 0% | 0% |
| \$200 | 7% | 3% | 2% | 2% |
| \$300 | 10% | 3% | 5% | 3% |
| \$400 | 14% | 4% | 9% | 4% |
| \$500 | 19% | 5% | 14% | 5% |

Average estimated likelihood – installation and energy



Source: Deloitte Access Economics (2021)

Likelihood of purchasing an EV as a result of Rebate: installation and energy costs



Source: Deloitte Access Economics (2021)


Policy impact

Additional policy considerations

- ACT Residents would be most responsive to a policy that created price competitiveness between EVs and conventional vehicles.
- Providing electric vehicles with preferential parking and express lane access would only increase the average estimated likelihood by 7%, although this represents a relatively inexpensive option.
- Increasing charger availability has an average marginal effect of 19%.

| Variable | Coefficient |
|--|---------------------|
| Static policy | |
| Preferential parking and express lanes access | 0.066** (0.020) |
| Access to convenient charging facilities | 0.189*** (0.020) |
| EV vehicles are price competitive with conventional vehicles | 0.226*** (0.194) |
| Intercept | 0.617 (0.318) |
| R ² | 0.42 |
| N | 1,499 |

Note: Control variables excluded for brevity. Standard errors in parentheses
 ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05



Note: These policy options have not been unitised.
 Source: Deloitte Access Economics (2021)



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