

# Optimal deductibility: Theory, and evidence from a bunching decomposition

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July 13, 2018

# Overview

*To what degree should taxpayers be able to claim deductions?*

- ▶ *What are the necessary statistics?*
  - ▶ Ramsey-style model of optimal deductibility.
- ▶ *How can these be identified?*
  - ▶ Bunching decomposition method.
- ▶ *What do the data tell us?*
  - ▶ Application to change in threshold of an Australian notch.

## A model of optimal deductibility

Taxpayer chooses consumption,  $c$ , gross income,  $y$ , and deductions,  $d$ , given tax rate,  $\tau$ , and deductibility rate,  $\rho$ , to maximise utility. Taxable income is  $z = y - \rho d$ .

$$\max_{c, y, d} u(c, y, d) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad c \leq y - d - \tau \cdot (y - \rho d).$$

Government then chooses  $\tau$  and  $\rho$  to maximise indirect utility,  $v(\tau, \rho)$ , and the external value of deductions,  $\Phi(d)$ .

$$\max_{\tau, \rho} v(\tau, \rho) + \Phi(d(\tau, \rho)) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \tau \cdot (y - \rho d) \geq R.$$

## Optimal deductibility rate

Assuming quasilinear, isoelastic, and separable utility:

$$u(y, d) = y - d - \tau \cdot (y - \rho d) \\ - \frac{n_y}{1 + 1/e_y} \cdot \left( \frac{y}{n_y} \right)^{1+1/e_y} + \frac{n_d}{1 + 1/e_d} \cdot \left( \frac{d}{n_d} \right)^{1+1/e_d},$$

the optimal deductibility rate is:

$$\rho^*(\tau) = \frac{1}{\tau} \cdot \frac{1 - \lambda^g - \Phi'(d) \cdot e_d}{1 - \lambda^g - \lambda^g \cdot e_d},$$

which has the usual Ramsey (1927) inverse-elasticity form.

# Standard bunching method




Figure: Densities with and without the notch

## Item choices when bunching

- ▶ Bunching decision is discrete, by comparing utilities.
- ▶ Bunchers reduce taxable income, equating marginal utilities of gross income and deductions.
- ▶ Use these conditions to solve for the deduction elasticity:

$$e_d = e \cdot \frac{\ln\left(\frac{\Delta d}{d_0} + 1\right)}{\frac{y_0}{z_0} \cdot \ln\left(\frac{\Delta y}{y_0} + 1\right) - \frac{d_0}{z_0} \cdot \ln\left(\frac{\Delta d}{d_0} + 1\right)} \approx e \cdot \frac{\Delta d}{\Delta z} \cdot \frac{z}{d},$$

where the deduction elasticity is relative proportional change of deductions and taxable income, scaled by ETI.

## Deriving the item elasticities

- ▶ Need to estimate five objects:

$$\hat{e}_d = \hat{e} \cdot \frac{\hat{\mathbb{E}}[d_1 - d_0]}{\hat{\mathbb{E}}[z_1 - z_0]} \cdot \frac{\hat{\mathbb{E}}[z_0]}{\hat{\mathbb{E}}[d_0]},$$

all conditional on  $z^* \leq z_0 \leq z^* + \Delta z^*$ .

- ▶ ETI, ATEs, and average outcomes under nontreatment.
- ▶ Need to observe treatment and comparison groups.

## Institutional settings

- ▶ 16% sample of ATO unit-record data.
- ▶ Largest deductible expenses: work-related car, clothing, travel, and education; charity; tax preparation.
- ▶ Medicare Levy Surcharge
  - ▶ 1% notch for childless singles w/o health insurance, and with taxable income above \$50,000.
  - ▶ In 2009, threshold increased to \$70,000.



# Institutional settings




Figure: MLS threshold over time

# Identification strategy





Figure: Bunching in the manipulation region.

# Identification strategy




Figure: Bunching in the manipulation region.

# Determining manipulation region



(a) 2008 histogram



(b) 2009 histogram

# Determining manipulation region




Figure: Density ratio from local-logit-regression predicted values

# Determining placebo region




Figure: Density under treatment in treatment and placebo regions

# Determining placebo region






Figure: Density under nontreatment in treatment and placebo regions

# Estimating ATEs



(a) Levels of taxable income




(b) Difference in taxable income

Pretrend-corrected DiD estimates:


- ▶ \$127.10 (26.61) among all taxpayers.
- ▶ \$526.73 (79.75) among bunchers only.



# Estimating ATEs



(a) Levels of gross income




(b) Difference in gross income


Pretrend-corrected DiD estimates:

- ▶ \$82.05 (56.74) among all taxpayers.
- ▶ \$340.03 (230.60) among bunchers only.

# Estimating ATEs



(a) Levels of deductions



(b) Difference in deductions

Pretrend-corrected DiD estimates:

- ▶  $-\$45.05$  (49.74) among all taxpayers.
- ▶  $-\$186.70$  (215.55) among bunchers only.

## Estimating ATEs




Figure: Pretrend-corrected differences-in-differences over time.

## Sufficient statistics

	% of TI	% of $\Delta$ TI	Item elasticity w.r.t.	
			Taxable income	Net-of-tax rate
Gross income	104.71	64.55	0.62	0.04
Deductions	4.71	35.45	-7.53	-0.45

Table: Estimated item elasticities (ETI is 0.06).

- ▶ With 20% efficiency loss, marginal dollar of deductions requires 68¢ in external benefits for optimal full deductibility.
- ▶ If external benefits were 30¢, then  $\rho^* = 0.34$ .

## Conclusion

- ▶ ‘Sufficient statistics’ approach: use structural model to derive parameters for optimal policy, identified via policy variation.
- ▶ Decompose ETI via relative proportional changes of items and taxable income in bunching.
- ▶ Deductions account only for 5% of taxable income, but 35% of the response of taxable income to taxes.
- ▶ Deduction elasticity  $-0.45$  and gross-income elasticity  $0.04$ .
- ▶ Deductions are granted at a high welfare cost.

*Fin*

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