

X-efficiency versus Rent Seeking in Chinese banks: 1997-2006

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Abstract

This study demarcates cost-inefficiency in Chinese banks into X-inefficiency and rent-seeking-inefficiency. A protected banking market not only encourages weak management and X-inefficiency but also public ownership and state directed lending encourages moral hazard and bureaucratic rent seeking. This paper uses bootstrap non-parametric techniques to estimate measures of X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency for the 4 state owned banks and 10 joint-stock banks over the period 1997-2006. The paper argues that reduced inefficiency is an indicator that the competitive threat of the opening up of the banking market in 2007 has produced tangible benefits in improved performance. This paper finds evidence of a declining trend in both types of inefficiency.

Keywords: Bank Efficiency, China, X-inefficiency; DEA. Bootstrapping

JEL codes: D23, G21, G28

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1. Introduction

In theory, the Chinese banking market has been open to foreign competition since the end of 2006. The strategy of allowing a larger stake holding in the Chinese banking system by foreign banks as a means of improving efficiency has a good academic pedigree. The link between privatization and efficiency improvement in former government owned enterprises is now very much an established finding (Megginson and Netter, 2001). The link between privatization of banking and efficiency improvement is an emerging research area (see Megginson, 2005 for a survey).

Given the impending listing of the major state owned banks and the tacit acceptance of larger stakes by foreign banks in the smaller commercial banks, it is not surprising that bank efficiency in China has become a popular subject of research in recent years. A number of studies of Chinese banking efficiency have been published in Chinese scholarly journals¹ but to date there have been only a few studies that are available to non-Chinese readers².

While the gradualist economic reform policies of Deng Xiaoping have transformed management practice and corporate efficiency in the manufacturing sector, it can be argued that the mindset of the corporatist thinking in management continues in much of the state owned enterprises (SOEs) in China, including its banks.

Cost inefficiency relative to 'best practice' is usually blamed on bad management and poor motivation. Following Leibenstein (1966) this efficiency gap is termed 'X-inefficiency'. In the context of an economy that has only recently begun to

¹ For example Qing and Ou, (2001); Xu, Junmin, and Zhensheng, (2001); Wei and Wang, (2000); Xue and Yang, (1998) and Zhao (2000) have used non-parametric methods while Liu and Song (2004), Zhang, Gu and Di (2005), Sun (2005) and Qian (2003) have used parametric methods.

² A recent exception is a study using non-parametric methods by Chen et. al. (2005) and parametric methods by Fu and Heffernan (2005)

open its banking sector, this paper argues that a significant cause of bank inefficiency is 'rent seeking' behavior, rather than X-inefficiency.

This research has three objectives. First it aims to decompose the measure of Cost inefficiency in Chinese banks into Technical inefficiency (sometimes viewed as X-inefficiency), and Rent-seeking inefficiency. This paper argues that while the underutilization of factors is consistent with the notion of X-inefficiency, the wrong factor-mix is indicative of 'rent-seeking'. The decomposition of cost inefficiency into X-inefficiency (technical inefficiency) and rent-seeking inefficiency allows us to examine their evolution over the sample period.

Second, this paper aims to provide an inferential capability to the point-estimates of inefficiency through the use of bootstrapping methods. Third, the bootstrap estimates inefficiency are use to test various hypotheses regarding the levels and trends in X-inefficiency ad rent-seeking inefficiency. The threat of entry of foreign banks into the Chinese market should lead to improved management, which should result in improved technical efficiency and lower cost-inefficiency as incumbent banks attempt to cut costs and consolidate their balance sheets.

This paper is organized on the following lines. The next section outlines the background to the Chinese banking system. Section 3 discusses the methodology of the non-parametric method of estimating bank efficiency and the application of bootstrapping technology. Section 4 reviews the literature and discusses the concept of X-inefficiency and the implications for its measurement in the context of banking. Section 5 discusses the data. Section 6 discusses the results and section 7 concludes.

2. Chinese Banking

In 2005, the Chinese banking system consisted of some 30,000 institutions, including 3 policy banks, 4 state-owned commercial banks, 131 joint-stock commercial banks, 115 city commercial banks, 238 operational entities of foreign banks and the rest made up of urban and rural credit cooperatives and other financial institutions.

Like many economies that have undeveloped financial and capital markets, the banking sector in China plays a pivotal role in financial intermediation. Table 1 below shows that the ratio of total bank assets to GDP has increased from 125%, in 1997, to 205% in 2005. The market is absolutely dominated by the four state owned banks, although their share of the market has been decreasing steadily through competition from the other nationwide banks (Joint-stock banks and some City Commercial Banks).

Table 1: The Chinese banking Market

Variable	1997	2000	2005
Total Assets to GDP	125.6%	147.1%	205.1%
SOB Employment	1,394.8 thousand	1,4936.3 thousand	1,364.2 thousand
SOB Market share % assets	88.0%	71.4%	52.5%
NPL ratio SOB	52.7%	31.5%	10.5%
ROAA SOB*	0.93%	0.78%	0.74%
NIM SOB*	1.8%	1.5%	1.7%
Cost-Income Ratio SOB*	48.2%	59.6%	45.4%

Sources: IMF *International Financial Statistics*, Annual Accounts, China Regulatory Banking Corporation website, *Almanac of China's Finance and Banking*, Bankscope data base, * weighted average by asset share

Return on average assets (ROAA) and net-interest margins (NIM) of the SOBs are respectable by Western standards but are well below levels that would be consistent

with economies in the same stage of development (as for example India where NIM would be in the region of 3%). Part of the problem is that interest rates were heavily controlled during this period and partly the large amount of non-performing loans on the books of the commercial banks. The non-performing loans (NPL) ratio of the SOBs has been falling from 52% in 1997 to 10% in 2005.

Faced with the potential of increased competition from the end of 2006 onwards, the big banks have begun the process of restructuring and reducing unit costs. Employment in the state-owned banks has declined in recent years and the major banks have worked to reduce costs as shown in the reduction in the average cost-income ratio.

Up until 1995, control of the banking system remained firmly under the government and its agencies³. Under state control, the banks in China served the socialist plan of directing credits to specific projects dictated by political preference rather than commercial imperative. Since 2001 foreign banks and financial institutions were allowed to take a stake in selected Chinese banks. While control of individual Chinese banks remain out of reach for the foreign institution⁴, the pressure to reform management, consolidate balance sheets, improve risk management and reduce unit costs has increased with greater foreign exposure. Table 2 shows the extent of foreign ownership of individual banks.

The theory of market contestability (Baumol, 1982) suggests that incumbent banks will restructure weak balance sheets, reduce costs, and improve efficiency in preparation for the threat of entry. Chinese banks should exhibit less inefficiency, whichever way measured, in 2006 than in 1997.

³ According to La Porta, et. al (2002), 99% of the 10 largest commercial banks were owned and under the control of the government in 1995.

⁴ There is a cap of 25% on total equity held by foreigners and a maximum of 20% for any single investor, except in the case of joint-venture banks

3. Methodology

Most studies of banking efficiency have focussed on the developed economies⁵. While there have been some studies of other Far Eastern economies⁶, the number is small in comparison. Indeed, of Berger and Humphrey's (1997) survey of 130 studies of frontier analysis in 21 countries, only 8 were about developing and Asian countries (including 2 in Japan). Studies on US financial institutions were the most common, accounting for 66 out of 116 single country studies.

The basis of the non-parametric method of Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) is the extension by Charnes et al. (1978) (CCR)⁷ of the single input-output model of Farrell (1957) to a multiple input-output generalisation. Technical efficiency (TE) is measured as the ratio of projected output (on the efficient frontier) to actual input used. There are a number of papers that describe the methodology of DEA as applied to banking⁸, and therefore will not be elaborated here. However, a two-input single-output illustration will aid the understanding of the decomposition of cost inefficiency into its Technical (X-inefficiency) and rent-seeking components.

Figure 1 shows an isoquant qq producing a given output with factor inputs x and n and isocost ww , which traces the ratio of factor prices. The efficient cost minimising position is shown at e where ww is tangential to qq . However, employing a factor combination shown by point c , which is to the right of the isoquant qq indicates that the firm is technically inefficient. Efficiency is decomposed into technical efficiency and allocative efficiency (AE).


⁵ Drake and Hall (2003), Cavallo and Rossi (2002), Elyasiani and Rezvanian (2002), Maudos et al. (2002), Drake (2001) Altunbas and Molyneux (1996) and Molyneux and Forbes (1993)

⁶ See Rezvanian and Mehdiyan (2002), Hardy and di Patti (2001), Karim (2001), Laevan (1999), Katib and Matthews (1999), Chu and Lim (1998), Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) and Fukuyama (1995)

⁷ Charnes et. al (1978) popularised the DEA method. Tavares (2002) produces a bibliography of DEA (1978-2001). There are 3203 DEA authors whose studies cover a wide range of fields. Banxia.com also compiles DEA papers from 1978 to the present.

⁸ The most recent being Drake (2004)

Figure 1: Technical Efficiency and Allocative Efficiency



Technical efficiency is measured by the ratio Oa/Oc (Technical inefficiency is given by ac/Oc). The cost to the firm is shown by $w''w''$ which is parallel to ww and passes through point c . Cost efficiency (CE) is measured by Ob/Oc and Ob/Oa gives AE⁹.

DEA constructs a non-parametric frontier of the best practices amongst the decision-making units (DMUs). An efficiency score for each DMU is measured in relation to this frontier. DEA is relatively insensitive to model specification (input or output orientation) and functional form¹⁰, however the results are sensitive to the choice of inputs and outputs. The weakness of the DEA approach is that it assumes data are free from measurement errors. Furthermore, since efficiency is measured in a relative way, its analysis is confined to the sample used. This means that an efficient DMU found in the analysis cannot be compared in a straightforward way with other DMUs outside of the sample.

⁹ It can be seen from this decomposition that under the assumption of constant returns to scale that $AE = CE/TE$.

¹⁰ Hababou (2002) and Avkiran (1999) provide a relatively thorough discussion of the merits and limits of the DEA.

There is a number of DEA software that is available for the general user. However, one of the criticisms levelled at the DEA approach is that it produces estimates of efficiency that are not open to statistical inference. In other words if a DMU has a score of 0.95, in what statistical sense is it 5% inefficient relative to the benchmark? Without the capability for statistical inference, non-parametric methods would be weak alternatives to parametric methods of estimating efficiency. However, uncertainties also exist in the estimation of efficiency using DEA. The most obvious uncertainty is what comes from measurement error. Measurement error in the context of data on Chinese banks is particularly marked. There are three potential sources of error; first differences between local bank's accounting procedures and those of international bodies, second differences between local bank's accounting conventions and third, researcher assumptions relating to the generation of missing observations. Other uncertainties arise from the estimation of the efficiency frontier; changes to the inputs and/or outputs can cause large differences in the resulting scores. Furthermore there may be errors in the sampling variation caused by the difficulty in obtaining a sufficiently large and consistent sampling frame.

Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000a, 2000b) propose a bootstrap procedure for non-parametric frontier models. Bootstrapping is based on the notion that if the data can be viewed as a random sample from an underlying population under a model (data generating process - DGP), then the process continuous random draws from the sample under the model generates also random draws from the population. The random raw can be viewed as a pseudo-sample and as a group of new benchmarks to compute the efficiency score for a given point. Following the Simar-Wilson method, 1000 bootstrap values of the individual DMU for all types of efficiency scores are generated in each year. Recent bootstrapping applications to DEA have been

conducted by Löthgren and Tambour (1999); in the case of banking efficiency by Casu and Molyneux (2005); and in the case of Chinese rural credit cooperatives, Dong and Featherstone (2004).

The bootstrap procedure for non-parametric frontier models is set out in Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000a, 2000b). The efficiency scores calculated with the original data are used to construct pseudo data. The bootstrap procedure is based on the idea that there exists a Data Generating Process (DGP), which can be determined by Monte Carlo simulation. By using the estimated distribution of the DGP to generate a large number of random samples, a set of pseudo estimates of the efficiency scores $\hat{\theta}_i$ are obtained. However this 'naive' bootstrap yields inconsistent estimates (Simar and Wilson, 2000a). A homogeneous bootstrap procedure that produces consistent values of $\hat{\theta}_i$ from a kernel density estimate is given in Simar and Wilson (2000b). The bootstrap algorithm is summarised in the appendix.

4 Literature Review

A number of efficiency studies of Chinese banks has emerged in recent years, using both DEA and stochastic frontier analysis¹¹. The consensus of finding from the DEA studies is threefold. First, because of the continued banking reform programme technical inefficiency has been declining over time. Second, average bank efficiency is lower in the state owned banks (SOBs) than in the joint stock banks. Third, the gap between the two has been narrowing in recent years.

Studies of bank efficiency have used the terms technical efficiency and X-efficiency interchangeably as if they were the same thing. While similar in concept

¹¹ In addition to the papers cited in footnote 1, other studies by Chinese scholars that have used non-parametric techniques include Xu, Junmin and Zhenheng (2001), Zhang and Li (2001), Fang et. al. (2004). Studies using parametric methods include Zhang, Gu and Di (2005), Chen and Song (2004), Liu and Liu (2004), Sun (2005), Qian (2003), Chi, Sun and Lu (2005), Yao, Feng and Jiang (2004)

they are not necessarily the same. The concept of technical efficiency derives its basis in the neo-classical theory of the firm and assumes profit maximising behaviour. A firm or a bank may be technically inefficient for technical reasons such as low training or low human capital levels of managers and workers, or the use of inferior or out-of-date technology. The diffusion of new technology is not instantaneous and some firms or banks may lag behind others in the acquisition and utilisation of new technology. With further training and updating of capital, the firm or bank can expect to move towards the efficient frontier described by the isoquant in Figure 1. X-inefficiency is not caused by the variability of skills or the time variability of technology diffusion but by the use and organisation of such skills and technology.

Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993) argue that X-inefficiency constitutes 20% or more of bank costs. Poor motivation and weak pressure resulting in under utilization of factors of production, is part of what Leibenstein (1975) describes as 'organisational entropy'. X-inefficiency arises as a result of low pressure for performance. Some institutions would be protected by government regulation that would reduce the external pressure of competition. But even with a higher degree of pressure from the environment, firms may have organisational deficiencies so that management signals and incentives are lost in the hierarchy of the organisation.

An alternative interpretation of X-inefficiency is 'rent seeking' in the sense of Buchanan (1980) and Tullock (1967, 1980). Rent seeking in its basic form is the appropriation of surplus in the process of production or exchange without any real contribution to the process of either. Where there are government regulations on enterprise, barriers to entry and other anti-competitive rules, officials have the opportunity to extract rents through the mechanism of bribery and corruption.

Therefore the term rent seeking has been generally associated with extortion, bribery and corruption.

However, a hidden but much more pervasive type of rent seeking is the extraction of larger budgets for bureaucracies and what results in the non-pecuniary rewards to workers in government owned enterprises (Tullock, 1967 and McKenzie and Tullock 1981). The prestige of the senior bureaucrats is enhanced if the size of the workforce is expanded to be larger than necessary to meet production targets. Similarly, offices are more grandiose, holidays are longer, and benefits are greater and so on.

Bogetoft and Hougaard (2003) suggest that the existence of X-inefficiency in production is the outcome of a rational decision making process that represents on-the-job compensation to managers. Whereas X-inefficiency is viewed by Leibenstein (1966, 1978) as non-maximising behaviour, Stigler (1976) argues that its existence is symptomatic of firms maximising their individual utility functions. Faced with a target level of output, a give set of inputs and factor prices, the bureaucrat minimises costs subject to a Williamson (1963) type utility function that includes in it arguments the level of output and a subset of factor inputs¹². In other words for the i^{th} bank, given the K factor inputs, the bureaucrat minimises costs to meet a utility function which contains the M outputs and a subset J of factor inputs, given standard neo-classical technology.

$$\begin{aligned} \min \Delta &= \omega'_k x_{k,i} - \lambda(U_0 - U(y_{m,i}, x_{j,i})) \\ \text{Subject to} \quad & y_{m,i} = f(x_{k,i}), m = 1, 2, \dots, M \\ & f'_k > 0, f''_k < 0, k = 1, 2, \dots, K \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

¹² In the case of Williamson (1963) the utility function of the manager includes reported profit and expenditure on staff.

The first order conditions are:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \Delta}{\partial x_j} &= \omega_j + \lambda(U'_m f'_j + U'_{x,j}) = 0, j = 1, 2, \dots, K - J \\ \frac{\partial \Delta}{\partial x_z} &= \omega_z + \lambda(U'_m f'_z) = 0, z = K - J + 1, \dots, K - 1, K \\ \frac{\partial \Delta}{\partial \lambda} &= U_0 - U(f(x_{k,i}), x_{j,i}) = 0, k = 1, 2, \dots, K\end{aligned}\quad (2)$$

The FOC show that an allocative inefficiency is created that result in higher factors inputs x_j above that implied by the optimal factor mix. In Figure 1, point e defines the optimal factor mix given the observed factor prices, but point 'a' while allocatively inefficient is the optimal position for the rent-seeking manager. A bank can organise its input factors to be on its production frontier but be using the wrong factor mix. Rent seeking in monopolistic public utilities involves over-staffing, 'elaborate offices and a lot of trips to important conferences' or 'expensive subsidised restaurants' (McKenzie and Tullock, 1981). The wrong factor mix in the case of the Chinese banking sector can be interpreted as excess staffing¹³. The management of the banks may reduce technical efficiency (X-inefficiency as it has been sometimes interpreted) by moving the cost frontier from $w''w''$ to $w'w'$, but would still remain cost inefficient as shown by the gap ab/Oc . The gap between the minimum cost optimal factor mix and the technically efficient minimum cost associated with the efficient production frontier with the sub-optimal factor mix (or allocative inefficiency) can be interpreted as the inefficiency associated with 'rent seeking'¹⁴.

¹³ In the case of pre-reform China, the bureaucratic bank manager would have been instructed to employ a quota of graduates from the central bank sponsored universities, and schools as well as retirees from the Peoples Army Officer Corps.

¹⁴ Crain and Zardkoohi (1980) suggest that X-inefficiency and rent seeking co-exist and that changes to X-inefficiency are offset by equal changes in rent seeking, so that there is a trade-off between one type of inefficiency against another.

5.0 Data

This study employs annual data (1997-2006) for 14 banks; the four state-owned banks (SOB), and ten joint-stock commercial banks (JSB). Data for one of the joint-stock banks was unavailable for 2004 - 2006 (China Everbright); and in those years 13 banks data was used. Data for one of the State-owned banks (Agricultural Bank of China) is not available for 2006. Rather than eliminate the bank from the sample in 2006, the data for 2005 was taken as representative. The total sample consisted of 137 bank year observations. The main source of the data was Fitch/Bankscope, individual annual reports of banks and the *Almanac of China's Finance and Banking* (various issues). The choice of banks was based on the fact that they face a common market and compete nationwide. A list of the banks used in the estimation is provided in the appendix.

Two approaches are normally taken in determining what constitutes bank input and output. Under the intermediation approach, bank assets measure outputs and liabilities measure inputs. In contrast, inputs in the production approach are physical entities such as labour and capital. Deposits are a measure of output. In this study, we consider three sets of outputs. First, we use three inputs and three outputs selected under the intermediation approach for the estimation of technical efficiency. Inputs are the number of employees (*LAB*), fixed assets (*FA*) and total deposits (*DEP*). Outputs are total loans (*LOANS*), other earning assets (*OEA*), and other operating income (*NII*). Although the latter variable remains undeveloped in China, it is selected to reflect the growing contribution of non-interest income to banks' total income.

Second, we consider the quality of the loan portfolio by stripping out non-performing loans (NPLs) from the stock of loans for each bank (*LOANSQ*). In both cases, the vector of inputs is the same as in the first case. The argument for adjusting

loans for NPLs is to mitigate the effect of the large loan portfolios held by the big-4 SOBs on the efficiency calculation. The unadjusted loan portfolio would bias the efficiency score upwards for the SOBs which have the largest share of loans but also the highest proportion of NPLs.

The inputs for the construction of cost-efficiency additionally require the factor prices of the relevant inputs above. We distinguish between the price of labour (PL), price of fixed capital (PK) and the price of funds (PF). The price of labour is obtained as the ratio of personnel expenses to employees. The price of fixed capital is operating expenses less personnel expenses divided by fixed assets (less depreciation). The price of funds is obtained from the ratio of interest paid to total funds.

The availability of uniform and comparable data on Chinese banking is a very recent development. Researchers have typically made a number of working assumptions to fill the gaps in data. In general, balance sheet data is available although the data revisions alter the figures from year to year and up until recently the accounting standards of Chinese banks differed from international standards (Ng and Turton 2001). The number of employees are available for the big four state owned banks but not for all of the joint-stock banks over all years. Similarly, the availability of personnel expenses varies across banks. In the years that personnel expenses were not available, the ratio of personnel expenses to total operating expenses in the adjacent year to the missing was applied. In the years where the number of employees was not available, the ratio of labour to fixed assets in the most recent year available was applied¹⁵. Where there were no personnel expenses available, it was assumed that

¹⁵ Fu and Heffernan (2005) assume that the employee growth matches the growth of total assets and they use the average wage paid by state-owned and other types of financial institutions to estimate labour cost.

the bank faced the same capital costs as banks of comparable size, which gave personnel costs as a residual.

Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the input and output data for 2006 as a snapshot indicator of the scale of the variables used. The high standard deviation is an indication of the dominance of the 4 state owned banks.

Table3: Output-Input Variables 1997 - 2006 (million RMB)

Variable	Description	Mean 1997	SD 1997	Mean 2006	SD 2006
<i>LOANS</i> RMB mill	Total stock of loans	430033	657201	1174038	1213224
<i>OEA</i> RMB mill	Investments	205103	301626	1037659	1203155
<i>NI</i> RMB mill	Net Fees and Commissions	862	1922	5200	6141
<i>LOANSQ</i> RMB mill	Loans less NPLs	246365	320844	1139258	1124600
<i>LAB</i>	Total Employed	105138	175233	125953	164260
<i>DEP</i> RMB mill	Total stock of Deposits	604013	891353	2167172	2258284
<i>FA</i> RMB mill	Fixed assets	12831	19398	32562	38745
<i>PL</i>	Unit price of labour	.0631	.0380	.1663	.0811
<i>PF</i>	Unit price of funds	.0502	.0202	.0172	.0025
<i>PK</i>	Unit price of fixed assets	.6528	.5282	.6478	.2242

Sources: Fitch/Bankscope, *Almanac of China's Finance and Banking* (various) and author calculations from web sources.

6.0 Empirical Results

Table 4 presents the yearly average of the pure DEA scores for each year broken down into Cost inefficiency, X-inefficiency (Technical inefficiency) and Rent seeking inefficiency for all the banks, the state-owned banks (SOB) and Joint-stock banks (JSB), so that Cost inefficiency is the sum of X-inefficiency and Rent-seeking inefficiency. We present the results from both CRS assumptions only. The relatively

small sample in each year could bias the scale efficiency estimates, which raises doubts about the VRS assumption¹⁶.

The numbers in table 4 are the starting point for the bootstrap exercise and are only indicators of the scale of the measure. Because they have no inferential capacity, there is little that can be said about them from a statistical basis. The difference in magnitude between the CRS and VRS estimates of relative X-inefficiency could indicate strong scale efficiencies, but this evidence would have to be interpreted with caution given the small number of DMUs per year. There is less difference in the rent-seeking estimates of inefficiency between the two assumptions. What can be said from the figures is that relative X-inefficiency has declined from a high in 1999 under either assumption. Similarly, the implied measure of inefficiency caused by rent seeking has fallen sharply from a high point in 2000 in relative terms.

The split between the state-owned banks and the joint-stock banks is more revealing. The results show that the average level of X-inefficiency is high under the CRS assumption for the SOBs but remarkably low under the VRS assumption. This is because size favours scale effects and therefore two of the state owned banks (Bank of China and ICBC) are benchmarks for the full sample and are therefore technically (or X-) efficient and cost efficient. The inefficiency scores for the remaining joint-stock banks confirms the trend that relative X-inefficiency has fallen to negligible levels by 2005-6. Finally, it would appear that at the end of the period, the average inefficiency created by rent seeking is lower in the case of the joint-stock banks compared with the state-owned banks, but in terms of the averages for the sample as a whole there is little difference.

¹⁶ The cluster of four large state-owned banks biases the scale efficiency estimates for the big-4. For the latter part of the period, the VRS assumption produced the implausible result of 100% technical efficiency for all the banks in the sample.

Table 4: Mean Inefficiency %, Intermediation Method - CRS; All banks (All), State-Owned banks (SOB), Joint-Stock banks (JSB)

	X-inefficiency			Rent-Seeking		
	All	SOB	JSB	All	SOB	JSB
1997	1.9	3.5	1.3	3.7	5.5	2.9
1998	3.0	1.6	3.5	5.2	6.4	4.7
1999	9.2	13.1	7.7	11.6	6.9	13.5
2000	7.9	16.6	4.5	15.3	8.2	18.0
2001	5.8	17.4	1.2	8.9	7.7	9.3
2002	4.5	6.5	3.7	4.0	9.3	1.9
2003	2.6	2.4	2.7	6.9	11.5	5.0
2004	1.3	3.4	0.4	8.1	10.8	6.8
2005	2.8	2.5	3.0	8.1	12.5	6.1
2006	2.0	3.3	1.4	6.4	11.8	4.1
Average	4.1	7.0	2.9	7.8	9.1	7.2

Table 4 also reveals a surprisingly large increase in average cost-efficiency (X-inefficiency plus rent-seeking inefficiency) in the period 1999-2001. This may be attributable to the activities of the Asset Management Companies set up to strip swathes of non-performing loans from the SOBs. In terms of the technology of the non-parametric method this would be interpreted as a drop in output but with the same factor levels would translate to a decrease in cost efficiency.

In Table 5 we present the results of repeating the efficiency estimation shown in Table 4 after stripping out identified NPLs from the stock of loans for each bank. The argument for stripping out NPLs is twofold. First, the stock of loans is quality adjusted by including only active loans. Ignoring the NPLs highlights the distortions to the estimates of efficiency caused by the activity of the Asset Management companies and the exclusive focus of its operation on the big-4 SOBs. Second, by taking out NPLs we make a small step towards the homogeneity of loans for each bank. Including NPLs in the stock of loans, creates strong size effects, which compounds the bias to scale efficiency of a small sample size. The large SOBs have the largest stock of loans but also the largest amount of NPLs.

The adjustment for NPLs reveals a higher average level of X-inefficiency in the SOBs compared with the JSBs. While the Bank of China and ICBC continue to act as benchmark DMUs, the Agricultural Bank of China and China Construction Bank show a lower average level of technical efficiency under both assumptions. There is little difference between the average level of rent-seeking inefficiency between the SOBs and JSBs over the sample period, but the average level of X-inefficiency of the JSBs is lower than the rent-seeking inefficiency.

Table 5: Mean Inefficiency %, Intermediation Method (NPL Adjusted) - CRS; All banks (All), State-Owned banks (SOB), Joint-Stock banks (JSB)

	X-inefficiency			Rent-Seeking		
	All	SOB	JSB	All	SOB	JSB
1997	19.5	45.9	8.9	5.5	6.6	5.1
1998	12.9	32.5	5.1	4.4	3.9	4.5
1999	12.5	28.8	6.0	10.7	4.9	13.1
2000	10.6	26.2	4.4	12.2	6.7	14.4
2001	7.6	23.8	1.1	6.8	6.5	6.7
2002	8.8	12.2	7.4	6.6	11.7	4.5
2003	4.8	7.5	3.7	8.6	12.1	7.2
2004	3.0	5.8	1.7	7.5	9.3	6.6
2005	4.1	4.2	4.1	7.7	11.0	6.3
2006	5.4	7.2	4.6	6.6	9.3	5.4
Average	8.9	19.4	4.7	7.6	8.2	7.4

While the estimates of efficiency shown in Tables 4 and 5 produce a picture of gradual improvement in bank efficiency from the beginning of the 21st century, little confidence can be placed on the figures for the lack of appropriate statistical significance. Table 6 presents the results of bootstrap estimation for the CRS assumption only. For reasons of brevity we show four years for both types of output.

Table 6: Bootstrap Estimates of Inefficiency (Bias corrected, median estimates); 1997-2006 (%) CRS

Bank	Output	1997		2000		2003		2006	
		X-ineff	Rent	X-ineff	Rent	X-ineff	Rent	X-ineff	Rent
ABOC	Loans	14.5***	50.5***	27.6***	36.6***	4.7	54.3***	8.5	47.5***
	Adjusted	69.5***	27.8***	54.8***	21.1***	28.5***	38.9***	25.3***	37.2***
BOC	Loans	34.5	25.6	33.9	0.0	43.9**	0.0	24.0*	8.6
	Adjusted	33.5	55.1	31.9	0	44.1**	0	24.3*	10.4
CCB	Loans	7.9	52.9***	42.7***	25.3***	16.0**	37.0***	34.7***	13.2
	Adjusted	72.4***	23.8***	42.0***	24.8***	15.5	35.3***	35.9**	13.7
ICBC	Loans	22.1	30.2	36.2	25.1***	19.4	23.9	12.6	26.8*
	Adjusted	72.9***	23.7***	48.7***	17.8***	11.4	36.2*	14.4	27.0*
BComm	Loans	40.1***	15.7	46.3	0	17.1***	38.7***	8.5***	42.4***
	Adjusted	43.7***	50.0***	45.9***	0	19.2***	37.2***	10.6***	40.7***
CITIC	Loans	44.3***	6.7	39.3***	23.8***	36.6***	10.6	34.0***	8.3
	Adjusted	39.5***	49.3***	38.0***	22.8**	38.1***	11.2**	37.2***	6.2
CMB	Loans	36.2***	17.6*	25.4***	34.6***	52.1***	0	32.3***	3.1
	Adjusted	28.1***	64.1**	24.0***	26.5***	52.1***	0	37.1***	0
CMBCL	Loans	37.2***	17.1*	22.1***	26.5**	25.2***	13.1	30.0***	0
	Adjusted	35.7***	51.0***	18.2***	28.7***	25.7***	11.2	31.9***	0
EVERBRT	Loans	48.5***	2.9	41.5***	16.0***	35.1***	6.1	-	-
	Adjusted	41.4***	51.5***	38.8***	17.9**	32.5***	21.5***	-	-
GDB	Loans	22.7***	37.9***	29.5***	34.6***	15.3***	33.6***	18.6***	22.0***
	Adjusted	54.9***	38.5***	35.9***	28.3***	16.1***	48.0***	23.7***	19.4***
HUAXIA	Loans	39.7***	15.4	23.6***	36.0***	31.0***	20.0***	33.7***	11.8*
	Adjusted	32.5***	59.1***	30.4***	19.7***	28.1***	22.3***	37.4***	10.0*
IBCL	Loans	70.6***	0	26.6***	34.4***	32.4***	18.1**	41.9***	0
	Adjusted	71.4***	0	22.9***	33.2***	28.9***	21.3***	44.2***	0
SDB	Loans	8.9**	56.3***	23.1***	41.3***	18.1***	29.2***	22.3***	18.1***
	Adjusted	66.7***	26.3***	31.7***	32.8***	21.4***	28.4***	25.4***	18.5**
SPB	Loans	51.3***	0	33.9***	31.6***	40.9***	0.9	3787***	0
	Adjusted	94.4***	0	33.3***	30.5***	44.7***	0	42.3***	17.0***
Average	Loans	34.2	23.5	32.3	26.1	27.7	20.4	26.0	15.6
	Adjusted	54.0	37.2	35.5	21.7	29.0	22.2	29.9	15.4

*** significant at 1% level one-tailed test; ** significant at the 5% level one-tailed test; * significant at the 10% level.

The estimates of inefficiency shown in Table 6 are based on the medians rather than the means as the former provide a more robust measure of the scores when the distributions are skewed as in the case of DEA. Table 6 shows that the bootstrap estimates of inefficiency are higher than those obtained from the simple DEA results shown in Tables 4 and 5. The adjusting of loans for NPLs has had a significant effect in worsening the X-inefficiency score of a number of banks but in particular the State Owned Banks (excluding Bank of China). This should not be a surprise as the SOBs have a larger concentration of NPLs than the JSBs over the sample. However by 2006

the NPL ratio for all the banks declined significantly so that the difference between the two measures produces minimal difference between the two measures of X-inefficiency.

Three questions can be asked about the bootstrap estimates as a whole and three hypotheses can be tested. First, is there a significant difference between the level of X- and rent-seeking inefficiency between the SOBs and JSBs and what differences do the NPL adjustment to loans make? The theory of rational inefficiency would suggest that there is a trade-off between X- and rent-seeking inefficiency, therefore X-inefficiency should be lower relative to Rent-seeking inefficiency. Second is their evidence that inefficiency is being reduced over time. The impending opening up the banking market under WTO rules would suggest that all banks would be 'upping their game' by improving cost efficiency, which implies that relative X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency should decline over the period. Third, if there is evidence of inefficiency reduction, is there a difference between the speed of reduction of X-inefficiency and Rent-Seeking inefficiency. The SOBs have in the past been used by the state to employ graduates from the central bank sponsored universities and to place retiring officers from the PLA. Consequently, rent-seeking inefficiency should decline at a slower rate than X-inefficiency. We explore these questions in turn.

Table 7 below examines the difference in group means of inefficiency using a non-parametric (Mann-Whitney) test. The first two rows of Table 7 show that mean estimate of X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency don't come from the same population and that contrary to the prediction of the rational inefficiency hypothesis, rent-seeking inefficiency is not greater than X-inefficiency on either measure of output. The last two rows of Table 7 show the means of X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency for the SOBs and JSBs with the two different measures of output.

Table 7: Mean inefficiency, Unadjusted loans and NPL adjusted loans

Measure	X-inefficiency		Rent-seeking Inefficiency		z value	
Unadjusted	34.0%		18.5%		-4.59***	
NPL - Adjusted	28.1%		18.8%		-7.35***	
	Unadjusted SOB	Unadjusted JSB	z value	Adjusted SOB	Adjusted JSB	z value
X-ineff	28.9%	36.1%	1.33	16.1%	32.9%	4.74***
Rent	19.4%	18.2%	-0.74	23.8%	16.8%	-2.19**

*** significant at the 1%

There is no statistical difference in the mean levels of X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency of the SOBs. However, stripping out NPLs from Loans produces clear differences. X-inefficiency is significantly lower in the SOBs than JSBs once NPLs have been stripped out of the loan portfolio but rent-seeking inefficiency is higher in the SOBs than JSBs. So evidence of rational inefficiency is more prevalent in the SOBs once the loan portfolio is adjusted for quality.

The second question is addressed by regressing the change in inefficiency on its lagged value. The estimated coefficient on the lagged value of inefficiency can be treated as the parameter of adjustment. A significant negative value indicates that inefficiency is declining (efficiency improving). The larger the absolute value of the parameter, the faster the speed of adjustment. The regressions are conducted as a pooled model of the form $\Delta Y_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta Y_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$ with adjustment for heteroscedasticity. The results are shown in Table 8.

Table 8: Beta value Inefficiency adjustment, CRS

Inefficiency	Bank Group	β - Unadjusted	t value	β - NPL adjusted	t value
X-inefficiency	SOB	-.251	-3.16***	-.425	-3.08***
	JSB	-.646	-8.93***	-.322	-4.73***
	All Banks	-.430	-7.39***	-.303	-5.40***
Rent-seeking	SOB	-.071	-.92	-.114	-1.59
	JSB	-.702	-8.79***	-.259	-3.85***
	All Banks	-.574	-8.19***	-.180	-3.84***

*** significant at the 1%

The most important result of Table 8 is that under both definitions of output there is strong statistical evidence of a negative trend in X-inefficiency. In this respect, the results of this paper differ strongly from the findings of Chen et. al. (2005) who find no trend improvement in bank efficiency¹⁷. The speed of decline in rent-seeking inefficiency is statistically insignificant in the case of the SOBs reflecting the political pressures the state-owned banking sector faces in downsizing and labour shedding but there is a strong negative trend in the case of JSBs.

Table 9 identifies the contribution of the trend in X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency to the decline in overall cost inefficiency controlling for bank specific and external factors.

Table 9: Dependent Variable Change in Cost Inefficiency (ΔCI_t), GLS estimation; heteroscedastic adjusted; z values in parenthesis

Variable	Unadjusted Output		NPL – Adjusted Output		
Intercept	.103* (2.21)	.077* (1.76)	.178* (1.86)	.066 (1.05)	.080 (1.28)
XI _{t-1}	-.549*** (9.21)	-.516*** (9.48)	-.115*** (2.71)	-.106** (2.50)	-.101** (2.35)
RI _{t-1}	-.733*** (12.62)	-.711*** (12.27)	-.159*** (3.91)	-.138*** (3.60)	-.131*** (3.46)
COST	.004*** (4.65)	.004*** (5.08)	.001** (2.44)	.001** (2.42)	.001* (1.93)
AMC	.059 (1.48)	-	.070*** (3.53)	.076*** (3.81)	.071*** (3.53)
SIZE	-	-	-.015** (2.23)	-.007 (1.62)	-.007* (1.72)
NPL	-	-	-.001* (1.73)	-.001 (1.40)	-
SOB			.034 (1.54)	-	-
Log-likelihood	115.3	114.3	180.0	178.8	178.2

*** 1% significant, **5% significant, *10% significant

¹⁷ Chen et. al (2005) uses a wider data frame of banks, including regional joint-stock banks and international trust and investment companies. It can be argued that the use of DMUs that do not compete in the same geographical market or product is a violation of the homogeneity requirement of DEA.

The dependent variable is the change in cost efficiency. The independent variables are the one year lag in X-inefficiency (XI), one period lag in rent-seeking inefficiency (RI), the bank cost-income ratio (COST operational cost to total revenue), natural logarithm of total deposits as a proxy for the size of the bank (SIZE), a dummy variable for the years when the asset management companies took over a proportion of the NPLs of the SOBs (NPL), a dummy variable to identify the state-owned banks (SOB).

Table 9 shows that the decline in rent-seeking inefficiency has a stronger impact on the improvement in cost efficiency than the decline in X-inefficiency in the case of the unadjusted output. However, once the loan portfolio is adjusted for NPLS, allowing for the overall costs of the bank and the operations of the asset management companies, the reduction in rent-seeking inefficiency contributes only marginally more to improvements in cost efficiency than the reduction X-inefficiency. The table also shows that there is weak evidence that larger banks have a faster decline in cost inefficiency.

7.0 Conclusion

This paper has used non-parametric methods to conduct an analysis of inefficiency in a sample of Chinese banks. The estimates of bank inefficiency were buttressed with bootstrapping techniques to enable statistical inference. In general, the estimates from bootstrapping support the view that relative efficiency has improved. We have partitioned cost inefficiency into X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency in the spirit of the rational inefficiency model. Inefficiency in Chinese banking is made up of both X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency. Adjusting

for the quality of the loan portfolio, this paper shows that bureaucratic rent-seeking is more prevalent in the state-owned banking sector than in the JSBs.

Bureaucratic rent seeking is a rational response to a particular set of incentives based on protectionist policy. It would be no surprise to learn that over the years of protected growth, as the banks were vessels for the channelling of unprofitable loans to state-owned enterprises, the banking sector was forced to develop rent seeking strategies and act as employment sponges for the educated youth in China. While the dismantling of protection and the listing of the state-owned banks and the plans to list joint stock banks will alter the incentive structure for managers, the trend reduction in rent-seeking inefficiency will be balanced by social and political constraints – particularly those faced by the SOBs.

However, we must still interpret the results with caution. The improvement in efficiency is in terms of the benchmark banks, which are themselves 'best-practice' Chinese banks. The real benchmarks should be foreign banks competing on an equal footing or foreign banks operating in their home countries under similar conditions of development and risk.

This paper does not suggest that the Chinese banking system is in good shape to face the threats of post 2007. The argument of this paper is that there have been significant improvements in bank efficiency. The main message of this paper is that while Chinese banks may not be in the best shape they could be to meet the challenges of post 2007, they are in better shape than they have ever been.

Appendix: Bootstrapping Procedure

Bootstrap Algorithm

The algorithm is run on MATLAB and the codes are available from the authors on request.

Step 1. Compute the original DEA efficiency scores using the linear programming model (equation 1) and let $\hat{\delta}_i = 1/\hat{\theta}_i$;

Step 2. Since radial distances are used, we will refer to the polar coordinate of the input vector of each DMU x defined by its modulus $\omega = \omega(x) = \sqrt{x'x}$ and its angle

$$\eta = \eta(x) \in \left[0, \frac{\pi}{2}\right]^{K-1} \quad \text{where for } j=1, \dots, K-1, \quad \eta_j = \arctan(x_{j+1}/x_1) \quad \text{if } x_1 > 0 \quad \text{and}$$

$$\eta_j = \frac{\pi}{2} \quad \text{if } x_1 = 0. \quad \text{Then translate the data into polar coordinates: } (y_i, \eta_i, \hat{\delta}_i), \quad i = 1, \dots$$

, K . And form the augmented matrix \tilde{L} by: $L = \begin{bmatrix} y_i & \eta_i & \hat{\delta}_i \end{bmatrix}$, $L_R = \begin{bmatrix} y_i & \eta_i & 2 - \hat{\delta}_i \end{bmatrix}$,

$$\tilde{L} = \begin{bmatrix} L \\ L_R \end{bmatrix}$$

Step 3. Compute the estimated covariance matrices $\hat{\Sigma}_1, \hat{\Sigma}_2$ of L and L_R by

$$\hat{\Sigma}_1 = \begin{bmatrix} S_{11} & S_{12} \\ S_{21} & S_{22} \end{bmatrix} \quad \hat{\Sigma}_2 = \begin{bmatrix} S_{11} & -S_{12} \\ -S_{21} & S_{22} \end{bmatrix}$$

where S_{11} is $(M + N - 1) \times (M + N - 1)$, $S_{12} = S'_{21}$ is $(M + N - 1) \times 1$ and S_{22} is scalar,

and compute the lower triangular matrices L_1 and L_2 such that $\hat{\Sigma}_1 = L_1 L'_1$ and

$\hat{\Sigma}_2 = L_2 L'_2$ via the Cholesky decomposition.

Step 4. Choose an appropriate bandwidth h as described in Simar and Wilson (2000b)

using the information in $\tilde{L}, \hat{\Sigma}_1, \hat{\Sigma}_2$.

Step 5. Draw K rows randomly, with replacement from the augmented matrix \tilde{L} and denote the result by the $K \times (M + N)$ matrix \tilde{L}^* ; compute \bar{z}^* , the $K \times 1$ row vector containing the means of each column of \tilde{L}^* .

Step 6. Use a random number generator to generate a $K \times (M + N)$ matrix ε of i.i.d. standard normal pseudo-random variates; let ε_i denote the i th row of this matrix.

Then compute the $K \times (M + N)$ matrix ε^* with the i th row ε_i^* given by $\varepsilon_i^* = \varepsilon_i L_j'$ so that $\varepsilon_i^* \sim N_{M+N}(0, \hat{\Sigma}_j)$ where $j=1$ if the i th row of \tilde{L}^* was drawn from rows $1, \dots, K$ of \tilde{L} , or $j=2$ if the i th row of \tilde{L}^* was drawn from rows $(K + 1), \dots, 2K$ of \tilde{L} .

Step 7. Compute the $K \times (M + N)$ matrix $\Gamma = (1 + h^2)^{-1/2} (M\tilde{L}^* + h\varepsilon^*) + i_K \otimes \bar{z}^*$

where $M = I_K - (1/K)i_K i_K'$ is the usual $K \times K$ centring matrix with I_K denoting an identity matrix of order K , i_K a $K \times 1$ vector of ones, and \otimes denotes the Kronecker product.

Step 8. Partition Γ so that $\Gamma = [\gamma_{i1} \ \gamma_{i2} \ \gamma_{i3}]$, where $\gamma_{i1} \in R_+^M$ $\gamma_{i2} \in [0, \pi/2]^{K-1}$ and $\gamma_{i3} \in (-\infty, +\infty)$ for $i = 1, \dots, K$. Define the $K \times (M + N)$ matrix of bootstrap pseudo-data L^* such that the i th row z_i^* of L^* is given by

$$z_i^* = \begin{cases} (\gamma_{i1} \ \gamma_{i2} \ \gamma_{i3}) & \gamma_{i3} \geq 1 \\ (\gamma_{i1} \ \gamma_{i2} \ 2 - \gamma_{i3}) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Step 9. Translate the polar coordinates in L^* to Cartesian coordinates. This yields the bootstrap sample $\{(x_i^*, y_i^*)\}_{i=1}^K$.

Step 10. For the given point (x, y) , compute $\hat{\theta}^*(x, y)$ by solving the DEA program taking $\{(x_i^*, y_i^*)\}_{i=1}^K$ as the benchmarks and compute the bias-corrected efficiency scores $\tilde{\theta}(x, y) = \hat{\theta}^2 / \hat{\theta}^*$

Step 11. Repeat Steps 5~11, obtain another group of bias-corrected efficiency scores, reducing the input vector of each DMU x into $\tilde{\theta}x$. Compute the cost efficiency scores using equation(2) from the reduced inputs and outputs.

Step 12. Similar to Step 11, obtain rent-seeking-efficiency scores (the difference between cost-efficiency score and technical (x)-efficiency score)

Step 13. Repeat Steps 5~12 B (=1000) times to obtain a set of bootstrap estimates

$\{\tilde{\theta}_b(x, y)\}_{b=1}^B$ and cost efficiency scores and x-efficiency scores.

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